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Abstract
We use a simple model of corporate investment to determine when investment will be sensitive
to non-fundamental movements in stock prices. The key cross-sectional prediction of the model
is that stock prices will have a stronger impact on the investment of firms that are “equity
dependent” – firms that need external equity to finance their marginal investments. Using an
index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we find strong
support for this prediction. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have
investment that is two-and-a-half times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom
quintile. We also verify several other predictions of the model.
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1I. Introduction
Corporate investment and the stock market are positively correlated, both in the time
series and in the cross-section. The traditional explanation for this relationship is that stock
prices rationally reflect the marginal product of capital. This is the usual interpretation given to
the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q, for example, as in Tobin (1969) and von
Furstenberg (1977).
A very different explanation is suggested by Keynes (1936). Keynes argues that stock
prices contain an important element of irrationality. As a result, the effective cost of external
equity sometimes diverges from the cost of other forms of capital. This affects the pattern of
equity issues and in turn corporate investment. This “equity financing channel” has been
developed in work by Bosworth (1975), Fischer and Merton (1984), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990), Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) and Stein (1996).
It has proven difficult to determine the relative merits of these explanations. This is partly
because the equity financing channel has not been articulated in a form that can be empirically
distinguished from the traditional view. Empirical tests have had to focus on indirect
implications of the two views, or else have had to impose structural assumptions on the data. For
example, researchers taking the former approach have examined whether the stock market
forecasts investment over and above other measures of the marginal product of capital, such as
profitability or cash flow. If it does not, they argue, then the stock market is probably connected
to investment only insofar as it reflects fundamentals.
This empirical strategy has yielded mixed results. Barro (1990, p. 130) attributes an
important independent role to the stock market: “Even in the presence of cash flow variables,
such as contemporaneous and lagged values of after-tax corporate profits, the stock market
2variable retains significant predictive power for investment.” In contrast, Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990, p. 199) conclude from their analysis of firm-level data that “the market may not
be a complete sideshow, but nor is it very central.” And Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993, p.
132) summarize their study of the aggregate data by stating that “market valuation appears to
play a limited role, given fundamentals, in the determination of investment decisions.”
Another empirical strategy is to try to measure inefficiency directly as the difference
between market prices and a structural model of efficient prices, and then test whether
investment is sensitive to this measure of inefficiency. In a study of aggregate Japanese data,
Chirinko and Schaller (2001) find evidence for an equity financing channel using this approach.
As they point out, however, their conclusions depend on several structural assumptions.
In this paper we take a new approach. We return to the theory to derive several cross-
sectional predictions that are unique to a specific equity financing channel. In particular, the
model in Stein (1996) implies that firms that are in need of external equity finance will have
investment that is especially sensitive to the non-fundamental component of stock prices.
Intuitively, a firm with no debt and a stockpile of cash can insulate its investment decisions from
irrational gyrations in its stock price. But an “equity-dependent” firm that needs equity to fund its
marginal investments will be less likely to proceed if it has to issue undervalued shares. The
theory thus identifies a specific equity financing channel that suggests when the market matters
in the cross-section and, at the same time, why it matters.
We test several implications of this financing channel. To get started, we need a proxy for
the concept of equity dependence. This concept requires some financing friction, or combination
of frictions, which makes certain firms more reliant on outside equity at the margin. Standard
corporate-finance considerations suggest that equity-dependent firms will tend to be young, and
3to have high leverage, low cash balances and cash flows, high cash flow volatility (and hence
low incremental debt capacity) and strong investment opportunities.1 One off-the-shelf measure
which satisfies most of these criteria is an index based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales
(1997). This “KZ index” has already been adapted for use in large-sample empirical work by
Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001), so we can follow their methodology exactly. By taking
this approach, as opposed to building our own measure of equity dependence from scratch, we
hope to minimize any concerns about data mining.
Next, we rank firms according to this proxy for equity dependence, and test in a variety
of ways whether those that are classified as most likely to be equity dependent have the strongest
correlation between stock prices and subsequent investment. We find strong support for this
prediction. In our baseline specification, firms that rank in the top quintile of the sample in terms
of the KZ index have a sensitivity of investment to stock prices that is roughly two-and-a-half
times as large as firms that rank in the bottom quintile.2 Put differently, our results suggest that
the investment of equity-dependent firms is in some circumstances more sensitive to Q than to
cash flow. This is noteworthy because it is generally believed that the cash flow effect uniformly
dominates the Q effect in investment equations.
We also examine whether these results for investment reflect the specific equity financing
mechanism outlined in the model. This involves a test of whether the firms who are the most
likely to be equity dependent also have the strongest correlation between stock prices and the
                                                          
1 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) look for a financing channel using firm size as their only proxy for equity
dependence. They argue that the “hypothesis predicts that the influence of the stock market should be particularly
great for smaller firms, which rely to a greater extent on external financing” (p. 182). However, they find little
evidence that the investment of smaller firms is especially sensitive to stock prices, and conclude that there is little
support for the hypothesis. As we show, the use of a more fully developed measure of equity dependence leads to
quite different conclusions.
2 The result that investment is more sensitive to Q for high-KZ firms actually shows up in Kaplan and Zingales’
(1997) small 49-firm sample. However, their focus is on a different question – how investment-cash flow
sensitivities vary with financial constraints – and they never discuss or interpret this particular finding.
4volume of new equity issues. We find support for this hypothesis as well: Firms with high values
of the KZ index also have equity issuance behavior that is more responsive to stock prices than
their low-KZ counterparts.
Our results offer support for a specific equity financing channel in corporate investment.
They also complement other evidence that the cost of external equity has an important,
independent effect on corporate financing and investment decisions. For example, Ritter (1991),
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Speiss and Affleck-
Graves (1995), and Baker and Wurgler (2000) find evidence that equity financing patterns
depend on the cost of equity, and Baker and Wurgler (2002) use these results to motivate an
alternative view of capital structure. Shleifer and Vishny (2001) argue that the cost of equity is a
strong determinant of merger activity, explaining the form of financing in mergers as well as
merger waves themselves. Whereas the capital structure findings could be viewed as financial
phenomena without significant real effects, however, our results point to a specific channel
through which market inefficiency may affect the real economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop several testable hypotheses
in the context of a simple model. The model provides some guidance as to how to measure
equity dependence in practice, and provides a framework for thinking about competing
hypotheses. In Section III, we describe the data, and in Section IV, we present the empirical
results. Section V concludes.
5II. Hypothesis development
A.  A simple model
We use a simplified version of the model in Stein (1996) to develop several testable
hypotheses about equity dependence and investment. For starters, consider a firm that can invest
K at time 0, which yields a gross return of f(K) at time 1, where f(⋅) is an increasing, concave
function. The efficient-market discount rate is r, so the net present value of this investment is
( ) Kr
Kf
−+1 . The first-best level of investment K
fb is therefore given by ( ) 11 =+′ rKf
fb
.
The firm also has financing considerations. Its equity may be mispriced by some
percentage δ relative to the efficient-market value, either overpriced (δ > 0) or underpriced (δ <
0), while its debt is fairly priced.3 The firm can issue equity e subject to the constraints that 0 ≤ e
≤ emax. In other words, it cannot repurchase shares, and there is an upper bound on how much it
can issue. Financing and investment are linked by a leverage constraint, 0)1( ≥−−+ DKWe ,
where W is the firm’s pre-existing wealth (such as cash on hand, or untapped debt capacity) and
D  is the fractional debt capacity of the new assets. This constraint implies that the firm’s debt
ratio can fall below D  but cannot exceed it.4
                                                          
3 The model interprets δ as an irrational variation in the cost of external equity, but one could also view it as a
rational gap between the cost of external and internal equity that reflects adverse-selection problems (Myers and
Majluf (1984)). Moreover, some authors have argued that adverse-selection problems are mitigated in good times,
which are generally associated with high stock prices (Lucas and McDonald (1990), Choe, Masulis and Nanda
(1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996)). Such an interpretation of δ can lead to similar empirical predictions. Our
own view is that the first story – based on market inefficiencies – is a more compelling way of thinking about the
connection between equity issues and stock prices, and more consistent with the evidence from surveys and long-run
stock returns following equity issues. However, we note that none of our tests seek to discriminate between these
stories. In fact, both of them are based on the same idea: managers try to time the market by selling stock when they
think it is overvalued, and by sitting out when they think it is undervalued. The only difference is whether investors
fully account for this motive.
4 These constraints simplify the exposition, but they can be dispensed with in a fuller model. For example, both
repurchases and equity issues could be bounded endogenously by assuming that there are price-pressure effects that
increase with the size of the repurchase or issue. The simple form of the leverage constraint can also be generalized
by having costs of financial distress that increase continuously whenever the debt ratio exceeds D . These
generalizations are considered in Stein (1996).
6Putting all this together, the firm’s optimization problem is given by:
( ) eK
r
Kf
Ke
δ+−
+1
max
,
, (1)
subject to
0)1( ≥−−+ DKWe  and (2)
0 ≤ e ≤ emax.  (3)
Proposition 1 summarizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 1: Assume that emax > Kfb(1- D ). Then the possible outcomes are as follows:
i) If δ > 0, then K = Kfb and e = emax: An overvalued firm invests at the first-best level and
issues as much equity as possible.
ii) If δ < 0 and W – Kfb(1- D ) ≥ 0, then K = Kfb and e = 0: An undervalued firm with
sufficient wealth W invests at the first-best level and avoids issuing equity.
iii) If δ < 0 and W – Kfb(1- D ) < 0, then K < Kfb: An undervalued firm with insufficient
wealth underinvests. This case admits two subcases.
a) Define Kec by ( ) ( )DrKf ec −−=+′ 111 δ . If W – Kec(1- D ) < 0, then K = Kec and e = Kec(1-
D ) – W > 0: The firm issues equity, and both investment and the size of the equity
issue are functions of the degree of undervaluation δ and debt capacity D .
b) If W – Kec(1- D ) ≥ 0, then DWK −= 1  and e = 0: The firm does not issue equity and
invests as much as it can subject to its wealth W and the leverage constraint.
The proposition makes clear when investment depends on the non-fundamental
component of stock prices. This happens only when two necessary conditions are satisfied: when
the stock is undervalued, and when available wealth is so low that the firm would have to issue
7undervalued equity to invest at the first-best level.5 We therefore define a firm as “equity
dependent” if W < Kfb(1- D ). The basic message of Proposition 1 is that for equity-dependent
firms, market inefficiency can act like a financial constraint, discouraging investment when stock
prices are too low.
B. Testable hypotheses
We boil Proposition 1 down to three empirical hypotheses. In each case, the null
hypothesis is the joint statement that stock prices reflect the net present value of investment and
that financing is frictionless – i.e., the benchmark Tobin’s Q mechanism. The hypotheses that
follow from the proposition, by contrast, maintain that stock prices have a non-fundamental
component and that debt capacity can be a constraint.
Hypothesis 1: Define a firm as equity dependent if W < Kfb(1- D ). Equity-dependent
firms display a higher sensitivity of investment to stock price than non-equity-dependent firms.
Hypothesis 1 is the primary focus of our empirical tests. As we state it, the hypothesis is
not conditioned on whether firms are over- or undervalued. It effectively averages over region
(i), where δ > 0,  and where equity dependence does not affect investment, and regions  (ii) and
(iii), where δ  < 0, and where equity dependence does matter for investment. Observe also that
for the undervalued, equity-dependent firms in (iii.a), the magnitude of the sensitivity of
                                                          
5 The conclusion that investment is sensitive to stock prices only when δ < 0 is a result of the one-sided nature of the
leverage constraint. One could also constrain leverage not to fall below some critical value, in which case investment
may vary with stock prices even when δ > 0. The model of Shleifer and Vishny (2001) implicitly embodies such a
feature—they assume that overvalued firms wishing to issue equity cannot simply park the proceeds in T-bills, and
must do something concrete, like acquiring another firm, to justify the issue. Hence overvaluation leads to more
investment in the form of mergers.
8investment to δ is governed by (1– D ), so that for a given starting value of K, firms with less
debt capacity have investment that reacts more strongly to stock prices. The intuition is simple.
When a firm has little wealth relative to its investment opportunities, it is forced to issue
undervalued equity at the margin to keep the leverage constraint satisfied. This tends to
discourage investment. And the lower is D , the more equity must be issued for each marginal
dollar of investment, hence the stronger is the negative effect on investment.
Proposition 1 also suggests various hypotheses that condition on δ – which we outline
next – but the unconditional statement in Hypothesis 1 is more straightforward to test
empirically, so we make it the focus of our empirical efforts.
Hypothesis 2: When δ < 0, Hypothesis 1 holds more strongly: Equity-dependent firms
display a particularly high sensitivity of investment to stock price when δ < 0.
Hypothesis 2 compares the undervalued, non-equity-dependent firms in (ii) to the
undervalued, equity-dependent firms in (iii), especially (iii.a). It is a more direct implication of
the idea that equity dependence matters for investment only when equity is undervalued – in the
model, when equity is overvalued, all firms invest at the first-best level regardless of the degree
of overvaluation. Therefore, conditioning on undervaluation should reveal a stronger effect of
equity dependence.
Hypothesis 2 is trickier to test than Hypothesis 1, however, because it requires us to
proxy for the absolute level of over or undervaluation. This is further complicated by the fact that
what really matters are managers’ perceptions of misvaluation. A variety of evidence suggests
that managers are not particularly objective when it comes to assessing whether their firms are
9fairly valued; indeed, they tend to be biased toward the view that their firms are chronically
undervalued.6 Thus, while we take a stab at testing Hypothesis 2, we view it more in terms of an
auxiliary test of the model.
Hypothesis 3: When δ < 0, equity-dependent firms display a higher sensitivity of equity
issuance to stock price than non-equity dependent firms.
Hypothesis 3 is a financing analog to Hypothesis 2. It reflects the fact that in region
(iii.a), the investment and equity issues of equity-dependent firms are tied together by the
binding leverage constraint, and so both are sensitive to undervaluation. In contrast, the non-
equity-dependent firms in region (ii) avoid issuing equity regardless of the degree of
undervaluation. If this hypothesis can be confirmed in the data, it will provide additional
evidence that our specific equity financing channel is driving any patterns in investment.
Unfortunately, testing this hypothesis again requires a proxy for undervaluation, so again we
view the results as somewhat provisional.
Note that our hypotheses involve simple comparisons between firms that are equity
dependent and those that are not – that is, comparisons across the regions in Proposition 1. We
can also ask what happens within region (iii.a) as firms become “more” equity dependent, i.e. as
W falls further and further below Kfb(1- D ). The answer to this question depends on the form of
the production function. Define the “degree” of equity dependence as Φ = Kfb(1- D ) – W, and the
percentage sensitivity of investment to stock prices as δddKKS ⋅= 1 . (This measure of the
sensitivity matches our empirical implementation, where we scale investment by existing assets.)
                                                          
6 Heaton’s (1998) model is built on just this sort of managerial overconfidence.
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It is straightforward to show that a sufficient condition for ΦddS  to be positive in region (iii.a) –
and hence for the sensitivity S to become ever greater as W declines relative to Kfb(1- D ) – is that
( ) ( ) 0<′′+′′′ KfKfK .7
When this condition is satisfied, there is a globally monotonic relationship between Φ
and the sensitivity of investment and equity issuance to the non-fundamental component of stock
prices. When it is not satisfied, we are left with the weaker prediction that S must increase as Φ
moves from negative to positive values, but need not be monotonic in Φ beyond that point. (To
be clear, our three hypotheses are based on this weaker prediction.) This situation is reminiscent
of the discussion by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(2000) as to whether the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is monotonic in the degree of a
different kind of financial constraint. Nevertheless, even if the sufficient condition is not
satisfied, the hypotheses show that the theory is testable as long as we can plausibly identify
some firms that are not dependent on equity at all – i.e., firms for which Φ < 0 – since the theory
unambiguously predicts that the sensitivity of investment and equity issuance to stock prices will
rise over at least this first part of the range of measured equity dependence. Whether these
sensitivities continue to increase over the whole range is an empirical question, however, and not
one for which the theory leaves us with strong priors.
C. Determining equity dependence in practice
Our theory defines an equity-dependent firm as one in which W < Kfb(1- D ). This
definition indicates that a firm is more likely to be dependent on equity when W is low (which
                                                          
7 Among the production functions that satisfy this condition are the quadratic, and anything of the form f(K) =
K/(K+A), where A > 2K.
11
translates into low profitability, cash balances, or previously untapped debt capacity), when Kfb is
high (investment or growth opportunities are high), and when the incremental debt capacity of
new assets D  is low.8 Therefore, a sensible empirical measure of equity dependence should
probably be: negatively related to operating cash flow; positively related to proxies for growth
opportunities; positively related to actual leverage, net of cash on hand; and negatively related to
the debt capacity of assets. Firm age may also be a factor, to the extent that young firms without
established reputations may have a harder time raising bond-market finance (Diamond (1991)).
These observations motivate our interest in the empirical section of Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), which contains an in-depth study of the financial constraints faced by a sample of 49
manufacturing firms. Using both subjective and objective criteria, they rank these firms on an
ordinal scale, from least- to most-obviously financially constrained. Most useful for our
purposes, they then estimate an ordered logit regression which relates their ranking to five simple
Compustat variables. The regression attaches positive weight to growth prospects (proxied for by
Q) and leverage, and negative weight to operating cash flow, cash balances, and dividends. Thus,
the parameters of this regression allow one to easily create a synthetic “KZ index” of financial
constraints for a large sample of firms, as is done in Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001).
The KZ index has some very attractive features from our perspective. It is an objective,
off-the-shelf index that has already gained substantial currency as an indicator of financial
constraints. By using it, as opposed to building our own measure from scratch, we hope to avoid
any criticism of data mining. Moreover, relative to what is suggested by our theory, the KZ index
seems at first glance to load up on each of the five included variables in the “right” way.
                                                          
8 These first two factors closely parallel the notion of “financial dependence” in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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The index also has some disadvantages as a measure of equity dependence, however. The
theoretical definition of equity dependence involves a measure of investment opportunities Kfb
that is distinct from mispricing δ. But the KZ index uses Q to measure investment opportunities,
where Q is defined as the market-to-book ratio, and several authors have argued that market-to-
book reflects mispricing as much as it reflects investment opportunities. This dual role for
measured Q (the fact that it doubles as a proxy for both Kfb and δ) must be kept in mind when
interpreting our results, since the model has the opposite implications for the effects of Kfb and δ.
Another disadvantage of the KZ index is that it does not include every characteristic that
could identify equity dependence. Firm age is a noteworthy omission. And given the important
role that available debt capacity plays in our model, we would have preferred to include leverage
relative to the firm’s debt capacity, not simply the raw debt level. In some of our auxiliary tests,
we supplement the KZ index with two more variables, firm age and the volatility of industry
cash flow (a proxy for debt capacity), in an effort to further zero in on equity-dependent firms.
The definitional shortcomings partly stem from the fact that Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
set out to measure financial constraints generally, not equity dependence. Though related, these
concepts are not exactly the same. For example, one can imagine a high-KZ firm whose
investment is sensitive to debt-market conditions, but that would not issue equity at any price.
An important part of our empirical work is therefore to confirm that high-KZ firms actually do
raise significantly more outside equity when stock prices go up.
D. Competing hypotheses
 Our null hypothesis throughout the empirical section is that the stock market is efficient
and that financing is frictionless. This leads to the benchmark Q specification, in which the
13
coefficient of investment on Q reflects technological adjustment costs.9 The full statement of our
null hypothesis is therefore that any cross-sectional differences in the sensitivity of investment to
Q reflect cross-sectional differences in technological adjustment costs. This theory is silent about
the sensitivity of equity issuance to Q.
An alternative hypothesis that is also distinct from ours is that any patterns we may find
in the investment-Q sensitivity are due to cross-sectional differences in measurement error. In
particular, the effects predicted by our model would also show up if measurement error were
more pronounced for firms that are less equity dependent.  However, an important point to note
is that such a pattern with respect to measurement error is precisely the reverse of that which has
for many years been discussed in the large literature on liquidity constraints.  For example, in his
discussion of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Poterba (1988) argues that their results
“could be explained on this view because Q is measured with more error for smaller firms, which
tend to be lower-dividend firms” (p. 202). Erickson and Whited (2000) and Alti (2001) further
develop this point; the latter builds a formal model to show why measurement error in Q is likely
to be greater for younger, faster-growing firms. Clearly, if these arguments are correct, our
approach stands on safe ground. The KZ index scores low-dividend, high-growth firms as being
more likely to be equity dependent. If these attributes lead to more measurement error in Q, our
tests will be biased toward being excessively conservative.
Nevertheless, it is at least possible to concoct measurement-error stories that go in the
opposite direction.  One way to partially address such stories, as well as the adjustment-costs null
hypothesis, is by “unpacking” the composite KZ index. The definition of equity dependence
leads to specific predictions for how each of the components of the KZ index should affect the
                                                          
9 This model is treated in the surveys of the investment literature by Chirinko (1993) and Hubbard (1998).
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sensitivity of investment to stock prices. If these predictions hold up in the data, advocates of the
competing hypotheses would then have to explain why technological adjustment costs, or
measurement error in Q, should be positively correlated with some of these variables and
negatively correlated with others.  Our further tests that look at how the sensitivity of investment
to stock prices varies with firm age and debt capacity can be thought of in a similar spirit.
III. Data
We study a large, unbalanced panel of Compustat firms that covers 1980 through 1999.
The panel excludes financial firms (i.e., firms with a one-digit SIC of six), and firm-years with a
book value under $10 million, but otherwise includes all observations with data on investment,
financing, equity dependence, and other investment determinants, as described below. The full
sample includes 51,982 observations, for an average of 2,599 observations per year.
A. Investment
We consider four measures of investment. Our baseline measure is CAPXit/Ait-1, the ratio
of capital expenditures in year t (Compustat Annual Item 128) to start-of-year book assets (Item
6).10 (CAPXit+RDit)/Ait-1 includes research and development expenses (Item 46), and
(CAPXit+RDit+SGAit)/Ait-1 further includes selling, general and administrative expenses (Item
189). We also examine the percentage change in book assets over the year, ∆Ait/Ait-1. To reduce
the influence of outliers, we Winsorize each of these variables the 1st and 99th percentile.11
                                                          
10 We scale our measures of investment and cash flow by book assets. This contrasts with some of the literature (e.g.
Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997)), where the denominator is net plant,
property, and equipment. Our approach matches our sample, which includes smaller and non-manufacturing firms
with modest fixed assets, and our measures of investment, which include intangible assets.
11 We have conducted a variety of robustness checks to determine whether our particular treatment of outliers makes
any difference.  As it turns out, all that matters is that we do something to tamp down the most extreme realizations
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Panel A of Table 1 shows summary statistics for investment. The reported minimum and
maximum values, like the other statistics, are post-Winsorization.
B. Financing
We consider two measures of external financing activity. To measure equity issuance we
use eit/Ait-1, the ratio of external equity issues to start-of-year book assets. External equity issues
are constructed as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings (∆Item
60+∆Item 74-∆Item 36). Total external finance is measured as (eit+dit)/Ait-1, which includes both
equity and debt issues. Debt issues are constructed as the total change in assets minus the change
in book equity (∆Item 6-∆Item 60-∆Item 74). These variables are also Winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for financing. These mean values are
sensitive to major financing events such as acquisitions and divestitures, despite the
Winsorization and the restriction on minimum book assets. The medians look more familiar. The
medians are also stable across the 1980s and 1990s (not reported).
C. Equity dependence
Following Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001), we construct the KZ index for each
firm-year as a linear combination of five variables:
itit
it
it
it
it
it
it
it QLEVA
C
A
DIV
A
CFKZ 283.0139.3315.1368.39002.1
111
++−−−=
−−−
 (4)
                                                                                                                                                                                          
of Q, which in the raw data attains a maximum value of 52.5.  An alternative to Winsorizing is to replace the book
value of equity in Q with 0.9 times the book value plus 0.1 times the market value, thereby bounding the
transformed value of Q below 10.  This procedure gives virtually identical results to those we report.  (We thank
Tuomo Vuolteenaho for suggesting this procedure.)
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where CFit/Ait-1 is cash flow (Item 14+Item 18) over lagged assets; DIVit/Ait-1 is cash dividends
(Item 21+Item 19) over assets; Cit/Ait-1 is cash balances (Item 1) over assets; LEVit is leverage
((Item 9+Item 34)/(Item 9+Item 34+Item 216)); and Q is the market value of equity (price times
shares outstanding from CRSP) plus assets minus the book value of equity (Item 60+Item 74) all
over assets.12 We Winsorize the ingredients of the KZ index before constructing it. When we use
this index to classify observations, we use its twice-lagged value in order to reduce any potential
concerns about hardwiring.13
In some of our additional tests, we consider two other variables that may help to pinpoint
equity-dependent firms. AGEit is the number of years since the firm’s IPO, defined as the current
year minus the first year Compustat reports a non-missing market value of equity. As discussed
above, this variable may be useful as a proxy for reputation and access to lending markets.
Industry σ(CF/A)i is the industry average standard deviation of cash flows. We calculate the
standard deviation of cash flows across the subset of firm-year observations for each industry
using the industry definitions in Fama and French (1997). This variable may help to capture
variation in debt capacity that is missed by the KZ index.
Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the KZ index, its five ingredients, and
the other two equity-dependence proxies. By multiplying the coefficients in equation (4) by the
standard deviation of the components, one can see that the KZ index is especially sensitive to
variation in dividends and leverage.
                                                          
12 As with investment, we scale the components of the KZ index by assets rather than net plant, property, and
equipment (Item 8), because our sample includes small and non-manufacturing firms. Although assets produce
fewer outliers in the raw KZ index, our basic quintile results in Table 3 go through equally well with either
denominator.
13 None of our results are materially altered if we use the once-lagged value of the KZ index instead.
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D. Other investment determinants
Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and many others, our baseline
investment equation includes year fixed effects, firm fixed effects, start-of-year Q, and
contemporaneous cash flow. Q and cash flow are as defined above.
IV. Empirical results
A. Hypothesis 1: Investment
We begin with a simple test of Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the investment of
equity-dependent firms is more sensitive to their stock prices than that of non-equity-dependent
firms. We use the entire pooled sample to determine quintile breakpoint values of the KZ index,
and then assign each firm-year observation to a quintile according to its time t-2 KZ index
value.14 For each KZ quintile, we then estimate the following investment equation:
it
it
it
itti
it
it u
A
CFcbQaa
A
CAPX
++++=
−
−
− 1
1
1
. (5)
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the coefficient b will generally increase as KZ increases.15
Figure 1 and Panel A of Table 3 show that there is indeed a strong relationship between
KZ and the effect of stock prices on investment. The coefficient b rises from 0.009 in the first
quintile to 0.025 in the fifth quintile. Thus, the firms that are most likely to be equity dependent –
                                                          
14 An alternative approach is to set separate quintile breakpoints for each year. This forces the observations to be
evenly distributed across KZ categories in every single year. This approach leads to results very similar to those we
report below. Another feature of our methodology is that a firm’s KZ quintile can vary from year to year. For
example, if its leverage increases, it may move to a higher quintile. We have also tried assigning to each firm a
permanent one-time value of the KZ index, based on the median value it takes within the sample. This alternative
also leads to similar results.
15 We have repeated all of the following investment regressions with specifications that include lagged investment
on the right-hand side. This may be helpful in better capturing the dynamics of investment, and in reducing residual
serial correlation. This specification change has little impact on our main results, however.
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according to the KZ index – have a sensitivity of investment to stock prices that is over two-and-
a-half times as large as firms that are unlikely to be equity dependent.
As an aside, it is interesting to look at how the coefficient c on the cash-flow term varies
with the KZ index in Panel A of Table 3.  Consistent with the small-sample results of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), we find no discernible pattern in this coefficient across the KZ quintiles.  It is
almost the same in quintile 1 (0.126) as in quintile 5 (0.133), and bounces around non-
monotonically in between.
To get a better understanding of economic magnitudes, note from Table 2 that the
standard deviation of Q in our sample is 0.91. Thus in the highest KZ quintile, the impact of a
one-standard-deviation shock to Q is to alter the ratio of capital expenditures to assets by 0.023
(0.91 x 0.025 = 0.023). When compared to either the median or the standard deviation of this
investment ratio (0.0598 and 0.0780, respectively), this effect is clearly substantial. As another
benchmark, note that the standard deviation of the cash-flow-to-assets ratio is 0.117, so that in
the highest KZ quintile, a one-standard-deviation shock to cash flow moves the investment ratio
by 0.016 (0.133 x 0.117 = 0.016). Thus among the firms most likely to be equity dependent,
stock prices have a slightly larger effect on investment than does cash flow. This contrasts with a
general belief that cash flow dominates Q in these sorts of investment equations.
B. Hypothesis 2: Investment and valuation
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the investment of undervalued equity-dependent firms is
particularly sensitive to stock price. This is a more precise statement of the basic idea of the
model, which is that undervaluation can induce a financial constraint on equity-dependent firms.
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This hypothesis is more difficult to test than Hypothesis 1, unfortunately, because it requires us
to find some proxy for misvaluation (or, specifically, a proxy for perceived mispricing).
One useful proxy for misvaluation may be the level of Q itself. Several authors have
interpreted the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for mispricing (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1994), La Porta (1996), and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)). While this
interpretation remains controversial, there is rather clear support for the use of market-to-book as
a proxy for perceived mispricing. This is suggested by several empirical studies. First, managers
state in surveys that mispricing is an important factor in the decision to issue equity (Graham and
Harvey (2001)). Second, managers actually do tend to issue equity when the market-to-book
ratio is high (Marsh (1982), Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991), Pagano, Panetta, and
Zingales (1998), and others). Third, managers tend to be net sellers in their personal account
when their firm’s market-to-book ratio is high (Jenter (2001)). Put together, these results suggest
that a sensible approach to testing Hypothesis 2 would use market-to-book, or Q, as a proxy for
perceived mispricing.
We therefore split the full sample into two subsamples, one containing low valuation
firm-years (Q < 2.00) and another containing high valuation firm-years (Q > 2.00). The choice of
2.00 is admittedly arbitrary, but it seems necessary to set the breakpoint above unity to reflect
such facts as intangible assets, inflation, and the aforementioned tendency among managers to
view their firms as chronically undervalued.
Figure 2 and the bottom panels of Table 3 show the sensitivity of investment to Q in each
of these subsamples. The results are generally consistent with Hypothesis 2. In the low valuation
sample, the sensitivity of investment to Q is strongly increasing in the KZ index, whereas the
effect is small in the high valuation sample. Thus it appears that our results for the full sample
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are almost entirely driven by the low valuation firms, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Panel B of
Figure 2 also shows that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is lower in general in the
high valuation sample. This is consistent with another feature of the model, that investment is a
fixed constant when δ > 0 – or said more realistically, that investment is sensitive to stock prices
in this region only to the extent that they reflect investment opportunities as opposed to
perceived mispricing.
In Table 4 we test the robustness of these results to other measures of investment. To do
this in a compact fashion, we pool the observations and run a series of interactive specifications
of the form:
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where Iit denotes one of four measures of investment.16 The coefficient of interest in this case is
c. Hypothesis 1 predicts that c will be positive, and Hypothesis 2 predicts that it will be
particularly high in the low valuation subsample.
Table 4 indicates that all four measures of investment give qualitatively similar results.
Another notable result is that d, the coefficient on the un-interacted KZit-2 term, is always
negative, and significantly so in the full sample and the low valuation subsample. Thus firms that
are more likely to be equity dependent also tend to invest less. As Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
point out, this is a basic implication of most any model of financial constraints, ours included.
Although the results of the valuation splits are consistent with Hypothesis 2, we are
hesitant to make them our central focus. The reason is again a twist on the Poterba (1988)
measurement-error critique. It is possible that Q is a poorer proxy for investment opportunities
                                                          
16 We have also examined specifications that include interactions of Q and year dummies, so that the Q-KZ
interaction term captures only the effects of cross-sectional variation in the KZ index, and no time-series variation.
This makes no perceptible difference to our results.
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when it is high, so measurement error could also lead to the sort of differences that we observe in
the valuation splits. This is why we view Hypothesis 1 as the most straightforward test of the
model, and Figure 1 as the most compelling empirical result. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that
the results are at least consistent with Hypothesis 2.
C. Decomposing KZ and the effect of other equity-dependence indicators
One hypothesis that we have maintained, not derived, is that the KZ index is a useful
measure of equity dependence. One way to examine this hypothesis is by decomposing our
previous results, checking how each of the five components of the KZ index is affecting the Q-
sensitivity. If each component works in the way suggested by our model, we can be more
confident that the index is a useful measure of equity dependence. This exercise also sheds light
on whether measurement error or technological adjustment costs are plausible explanations for
the earlier patterns, as discussed below.
To perform the KZ index decomposition, we again pool all observations, and then run the
following interactive specification:
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We run this specification for each of our four measures of investment. The theoretical definition
of equity dependence makes predictions for the signs of the interactions: c1 should be negative,
as should c2 and c3. In contrast, c4 should be positive. The only case for which the prediction is a
priori ambiguous is c5. If Q were only picking up variation in investment opportunities (i.e., were
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proxying only for Kfb), then we would expect c5 to be positive. But to the extent that Q also
contains information about mispricing δ, this will exert a negative influence on c5.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the predictions for c1, c2, c3 and c4 are largely borne out.
The strongest results are for c4, the interaction on the leverage term. Across all four definitions of
investment, c4 is always very significantly positive, indicating a strong tendency for levered
firms to have investment that is more sensitive to stock prices. The results for c1, c2 and c3 are
generally weaker, but overall consistent with the theory. With respect to c5, the interaction on the
Q term, we obtain consistently negative and significant estimates. (In fact, this negative sign
might have been anticipated based on our earlier valuation splits.) This is not what we would
have expected if Q were a proxy only for growth opportunities. It could be driven by Q’s other
role as a misvaluation indicator.
In Panel B we consider two other potential proxies for equity dependence that are not
included in the KZ index: firm age and industry cash flow volatility. We re-estimate equation (7)
augmented with these variables and their interactions with Q, denoting the interaction
coefficients as c6 and c7, respectively. We predict that c6 will be negative, on the premise that
younger firms are more likely to be dependent on equity. And we predict that c7 will be positive,
since higher cash flow volatility implies lower debt capacity, which again contributes to equity
dependence. The results in Panel B strongly support these predictions. Both c6 and c7 have the
expected sign for all measures of investment, and the estimates are always highly significant.
This exercise indicates that the earlier results for the composite KZ index reflect helpful
contributions from each of four components: cash flow, dividends, cash on hand, and leverage,
with leverage playing the strongest and most consistent role. However, Q is somewhat
undermining the appeal of the KZ index for our purposes – we would get stronger results if we
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threw Q out of the index. Given the theoretical ambiguities surrounding the use of Q in this
context, this is probably not surprising. The results also cast doubt on generic measurement error
or adjustment cost explanations: One would have to argue that measurement error or adjustment
costs are simultaneously increasing in some of these variables and decreasing in certain others.
Overall, the results provide a detailed picture of the type of firm that is likely to have a
high sensitivity of investment to stock prices: a young, non-dividend-paying firm, with a
depressed stock price, low cash flow and cash balances, and with high leverage relative to the
debt capacity of its assets. This picture fits the definition of equity dependence rather well.
D. Hypothesis 3: Financing and valuation
Our last hypothesis is that equity issuance by undervalued, equity-dependent firms is
particularly sensitive to stock price. If so, this would be further evidence that our earlier results
for investment are coming through the specific equity financing channel in the model. We test
this hypothesis within the same regression framework as before, simply changing the dependent
variable from investment to financing.
In Figure 3 and the first three panels of Table 6, the financing variable is equity issues
over assets, eit/Ait-1. Panel A of Table 6 indicates that for all firms, the sensitivity of equity
issuance to stock prices rises from 0.024 in the first KZ quintile to 0.044 in the fifth quintile.
Thus, averaging across all valuation levels, firms classified as most likely to be equity dependent
have equity issuance that is much more closely tied to their stock prices. This is the same pattern
that we found for investment.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that this pattern can be attributed primarily to the undervalued
observations. To test this we again split the sample according to whether Q is above or below
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2.00. Figure 3 and the middle panels of Table 6 show the results. As predicted, low-valued firms
that score high on the KZ index have equity issues that are especially sensitive to stock price. In
the top quintile of the low valuation sample, for example, the sensitivity is 0.078, which is
substantially greater than the bottom quintile figure of 0.036 and substantially greater than any
sensitivity in the high valuation sample. There is in fact no clear pattern in the high valuation
sample, as with our earlier results for investment.
The model does not imply that equity-dependent firms finance 100% of their marginal
investment with equity issues, of course. According to Proposition 1, in the relevant region of the
parameter space (iii.a) the leverage constraint is binding, so at the margin new equity and debt
are raised in proportions (1- D ) and D  respectively. This suggests the testable prediction that
equity-dependent firms should also be raising a significant amount of debt on the margin.
We examine this prediction using a total external finance variable that includes both
equity and debt issues, (eit+dit)/Ait-1. The results are in Panel D. They show that for firms in KZ
quintile 5, the sensitivity of total external finance is 0.103, whereas for equity issues alone it is
0.044. This indicates that the sensitivity of debt to stock prices is 0.057 (=0.103-0.044) for these
firms. This confirms that both equity and debt issues are closely related to stock prices in high
KZ firms, consistent with the model’s prediction that equity-dependent firms issue equity and
debt in lock step. For firms in KZ quintile 1, by contrast, stock prices have relatively weaker
effects on either equity issues or debt issues.
The results here support Hypothesis 3 and help to reinforce further the case that the
earlier investment results are being driven by the specific equity financing channel outlined in
the model. As predicted by the model, equity issues are especially sensitive to stock prices
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among low-valued, high-KZ firms, and debt issues appear to move roughly in lock step as these
equity issues create debt capacity on the margin.
V. Conclusion
A great deal of research has been devoted to understanding why stock prices are
correlated with investment. The traditional view, embodied in the Q theory of investment,
emphasizes the role of stock prices as indicators of investment opportunities. The alternative
view emphasizes the existence of some equity financing channel in which the cost of external
equity has an independent effect on investment. Empirical attempts to determine the relative
merits of these two views have not been very successful, however. The main reason why is
because the equity financing channel is usually not articulated in a form that yields distinct
empirical predictions.
In this paper, we use a version of the Stein (1996) model to develop a specific, testable
equity financing channel. The main cross-sectional prediction of the model is that firms that need
external equity to finance their legitimate investment opportunities – “equity-dependent firms” –
will have investment that is especially sensitive to the non-fundamental component of stock
prices. This prediction reflects, in part, the idea that undervaluation increases the effective cost of
external equity and therefore deters investment by equity-dependent firms. The model also offers
other predictions that are distinct from the Q theory.
We test the model using an index developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to identify
equity-dependent firms. The main empirical result is that firms that rank in the top quintile of the
KZ index have investment that is two-and-a-half-times as sensitive to Q as firms in the bottom
quintile. We also find support for several other implications of the model. For example, the effect
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of equity dependence is much stronger in a sample of firms that is more likely to be undervalued.
In addition, equity issues by equity-dependent firms are also more sensitive to stock prices,
consistent with the mechanism in the model.
The results complement other recent research on how the cost of external equity –
particularly the component that is irrational, or perceived as such by managers – drives patterns
in equity issues, capital structure, or merger activity. But they are of perhaps greater economic
importance than those findings pertaining purely to financing patterns, because they suggest how
stock market inefficiency may affect the real economy.
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Figure 1. Equity dependence and investment. Plot of the sensitivity of investment to market value by equity
dependence quintile. We sort firms into five quintiles according to the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of financial
constraints, performing separate regressions for each group. Year and firm fixed effects are included.
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We plot estimates of b. Investment is defined as capital expenditures over assets. Q is defined as the market value of
equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow over
assets.
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Figure 2. Equity dependence and investment, by valuation level. Plot of the sensitivity of investment to market
value by equity dependence quintile and valuation level. We sort firms into five quintiles according to the Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints. Within each quintile, we sort firms by valuation level according
to whether Q is below or above 2.00. We then perform separate regressions of each of these ten groups. Year and
firm fixed effects are included.
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We plot estimates of b. Investment is defined as capital expenditures over assets. Q is defined as the market value of
equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow over
assets. Panel A shows results for firms with Q below 2.00. Panel B shows results for firms with Q above 2.00.
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Figure 3. Equity dependence and equity issuance, by valuation level. Plot of the sensitivity of equity issuance to
market value by equity dependence quintile and valuation level. We sort firms into five quintiles according to the
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints. Within each quintile, we sort firms by valuation level
according to whether Q is below or above 2.00. We then perform separate regressions of each of these ten groups.
Year and firm fixed effects are included.
it
it
it
itti
it
it u
A
CFcbQaa
A
E
++++=
−
−
− 1
1
1
We plot estimates of b. Equity issues are defined as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings
over assets. Q is defined as the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. Cash
flow is defined as operating cash flow over assets. Panel A shows results for firms with Q below 2.00. Panel B
shows results for firms with Q above 2.00.
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Table 1. Summary statistics of investment and financing. In Panel A, investment is alternately defined as capital
expenditures (Item 128) over assets (Item 6); capital expenditures plus research and development expenses (Item 46)
over assets; capital expenditures plus research and development expenses plus selling, general, and administrative
expenses (Item 189) over assets; and growth in assets. In Panel B, financing is defined separately as equity issues
(∆Item 60+∆Item 74-∆Item 36) (i.e. the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings) over assets,
and equity issues plus debt issues (∆Item 6-∆Item 60-∆Item 74) over assets. All variables are Winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles.
Full Sample Subsample Means
N Mean SD Median Min Max 1980-89 1990-99
Panel A: Investment
CAPXt/At-1 % 51,982 8.20 7.80 5.98 0.18 44.70 8.76 7.77
   +RDt/At-1 51,982 11.37 10.41 8.42 0.24 58.14 10.90 11.72
   +RDt+SGA t/At-1 51,982 40.02 28.85 34.17 1.62 143.48 39.06 40.74
∆A t/At-1 % 51,982 11.08 28.10 6.38 -44.16 154.09 10.20 11.76
Panel B: Financing
e t/At-1 % 51,982 4.38 14.63 0.64 -16.31 93.73 2.95 5.48
   +dt/At-1 51,982 10.47 27.62 3.99 -34.74 164.53 8.35 12.09
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Table 2. Summary statistics of equity dependence and other investment determinants. Equity dependence is
defined using the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints, as implemented by Lamont, Polk, and
Saa-Requejo (2001). This index has five components: cash flow (Item 14+Item 18) over assets; cash dividends (Item
21+Item 19) over assets; cash balances (Item 1) over assets; leverage ((Item 9+Item 34)/(Item 9+Item 34+Item
216)); and Q. Q is defined as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding from CRSP) plus assets
minus the book value of equity (Item 60+Item 74) over assets. We also consider two additional measures of equity
dependence, firm age and the industry standard deviation of cash flow over assets between 1980 and 1999. Industry
definitions follow Fama and French (1997). Age is equal to the current year minus the IPO year, which is defined as
the first year Compustat reports a non-missing market value of equity. All variables are Winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles except for firm age and the industry standard deviation of cash flow.
Full Sample Subsample Means
N Mean SD Median Min Max 1980-89 1990-99
Panel A: Equity Dependence (t-2)
KZ Index 51,982 0.71 1.58 0.71 -6.60 5.94 0.57 0.81
CFt-2/At-3 % 51,982 10.65 19.07 9.08 -40.18 137.26 10.50 10.76
DIVt-2/At-3 % 51,982 1.66 2.83 0.67 0.00 20.18 1.86 1.52
Ct-2/At-3 % 51,982 14.00 26.03 5.05 0.01 185.73 11.00 16.28
LEVt-2 % 51,982 35.31 25.64 34.26 0.00 124.13 35.74 34.98
Qt-2 51,982 1.44 0.92 1.14 0.52 6.14 1.25 1.58
AGEt-2 51,982 14.99 10.33 12.00 1.00 49.00 14.76 15.17
Industry σ(CF/A) 51,982 138.20 211.05 60.16 10.94 863.50 136.96 139.14
Panel B: Other Investment Determinants
Qt-1 51,982 1.46 0.91 1.16 0.53 6.07 1.26 1.60
CFt/At-1 % 51,982 8.19 11.70 9.18 -42.78 36.57 9.24 7.39
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Table 3. Equity dependence and investment, full sample and by valuation level. Regressions of investment on
market value and cash flow by equity dependence quintile. We sort firms into five quintiles according to the Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints, performing separate regressions for each group. Year and firm
fixed effects are included.
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We report estimates of b and c. Investment is defined as capital expenditures over assets. Q is defined as the market
value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow
over assets. Panel A shows results for the full sample. Panel B shows results for firms with Q below 2.00. Panel C
shows results for firms with Q above 2.00. T-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Qt-1 CFt-1/At-2
KZ index N b [t-stat] c [t-stat] R2
Panel A: All firms
Quintile 1 10,397 0.009 [8.23] 0.126 [9.52] 0.58
2 10,396 0.015 [8.62] 0.109 [9.05] 0.60
3 10,397 0.020 [9.79] 0.172 [13.02] 0.59
4 10,396 0.026 [11.47] 0.160 [13.99] 0.58
5 10,396 0.025 [10.85] 0.133 [11.38] 0.56
Panel B: Low valuation firms
Quintile 1 8,191 0.021 [6.35] 0.125 [7.93] 0.59
2 8,657 0.024 [7.89] 0.139 [9.49] 0.60
3 9,032 0.036 [10.04] 0.176 [11.83] 0.60
4 9,168 0.045 [10.89] 0.167 [13.39] 0.59
5 8,827 0.050 [9.87] 0.156 [11.55] 0.56
Panel C: High valuation firms
Quintile 1 2,206 0.007 [4.16] 0.122 [4.83] 0.65
2 1,739 0.012 [2.78] 0.023 [0.68] 0.60
3 1,365 0.010 [1.99] 0.058 [1.28] 0.67
4 1,228 0.012 [1.99] 0.067 [1.32] 0.63
5 1,569 0.016 [3.57] 0.057 [1.63] 0.65
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Table 4. Equity dependence and investment, full sample and by valuation level. Regressions of investment on market value, market value interacted with
equity dependence, equity dependence, and cash flow. Year and firm fixed effects are included.
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Investment is alternately defined as capital expenditures over assets; capital expenditures plus research and development expenses over assets; capital
expenditures plus research and development expenses plus selling, general, and administrative expenses over assets; and growth in assets. Q is defined as the
market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. The measure of equity dependence is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of
financial constraints, standardized to have unit variance. Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow over assets. Panel A shows results for the full sample. Panel
B shows results for firms with Q below 2.00. Panel C shows results for firms with Q above 2.00. T-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Qt-1 Qt-1· KZt-2 KZt-2 CFt/At-1
N b [t-stat] c [t-stat] d [t-stat] e [t-stat] R2
Panel A: All firms
CAPX/A 51,982 0.018 [27.59] 0.002 [5.17] -0.007 [-10.61] 0.137 [31.11] 0.54
   +RD/A 51,982 0.024 [27.58] 0.002 [4.92] -0.009 [-10.82] 0.122 [19.65] 0.64
   +RD+SGA/A 51,982 0.043 [23.68] 0.004 [3.98] -0.016 [-8.59] 0.279 [21.30] 0.81
∆A/A 51,982 0.067 [20.52] 0.012 [6.22] -0.036 [-10.98] 1.151 [47.23] 0.31
Panel B: Low valuation firms
CAPX/A 43,875 0.037 [26.32] 0.004 [4.19] -0.010 [-7.86] 0.150 [30.21] 0.53
   +RD/A 43,875 0.042 [25.39] 0.005 [3.76] -0.011 [-7.78] 0.152 [23.19] 0.59
   +RD+SGA/A 43,875 0.061 [18.17] 0.010 [4.06] -0.022 [-7.59] 0.345 [24.47] 0.83
∆A/A 43,875 0.100 [16.88] 0.022 [4.62] -0.045 [-8.00] 1.254 [47.66] 0.30
Panel A: High valuation firms
CAPX/A 8,107 0.011 [10.16] 0.000 [0.21] -0.002 [-0.71] 0.067 [6.26] 0.63
   +RD/A 8,107 0.018 [10.99] 0.000 [0.36] -0.002 [-0.71] 0.009 [0.57] 0.71
   +RD+SGA/A 8,107 0.037 [10.82] 0.000 [0.17] -0.003 [-0.40] 0.095 [2.69] 0.77
∆A/A 8,107 0.061 [9.05] 0.012 [3.16] -0.050 [-3.76] 0.836 [12.77] 0.30
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Table 5. Equity dependence decomposition. Regressions of investment on market value, market value interacted with the components of equity dependence,
the components of equity dependence, and cash flow. Year and firm fixed effects are included.
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We report c. Investment is alternately defined as capital expenditures over assets; capital expenditures plus research and development expenses over assets;
capital expenditures plus research and development expenses plus selling, general, and administrative expenses over assets; and growth in assets. Q is defined as
the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets. Panel A decomposes the effect of the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index into its
five components: operating cash flow over assets; dividends over assets; cash balance over assets; leverage; and Q. Panel B adds two additional measures of
equity dependence, firm age and the industry standard deviation of cash flow over assets between 1980 and 1999. All components of equity dependence are
standardized to have unit variance. The first row indicates the sign the variable takes in the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index. The second row indicates the
predicted sign. T-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust.
CFt-2/At-3 DIVt-2/At-3 Ct-2/At-2 LEVt-2 Qt-2 log(AGEt-2) Industry σ (CF/A)
c1 [t-stat] c2 [t-stat] c3 [t-stat] c4 [t-stat] c5 [t-stat] c6 [t-stat] c7 [t-stat]
KZ Index
− − −
+ +
Prediction
− − −
+ +/− − +
Panel A: KZ index variables
CAPX/A 0.001 [2.00] -0.001 [-1.81] -0.001 [-4.24] 0.003 [6.46] -0.002 [-8.11]
   +RD/A -0.000 [-0.51] -0.001 [-1.39] -0.001 [-1.23] 0.003 [5.45] -0.002 [-6.89]
   +RD+SGA/A -0.004 [-3.81] 0.002 [1.57] 0.000 [0.00] 0.010 [7.58] -0.001 [-1.85]
∆A/A -0.003 [-1.47] -0.007 [-3.75] -0.001 [-0.42] 0.015 [6.04] -0.004 [-2.54]
Panel B: Additional measures of equity dependence
CAPX/A 0.001 [1.68] -0.000 [-0.76] -0.001 [-4.23] 0.002 [4.99] -0.002 [-7.48] -0.003 [-6.07] 0.008 [7.56]
   +RD/A -0.000 [-0.67] -0.000 [-0.68] -0.001 [-1.28] 0.003 [4.25] -0.002 [-6.61] -0.003 [-4.00] 0.008 [6.62]
   +RD+SGA/A -0.004 [-3.85] 0.002 [2.02] -0.000 [-0.29] 0.009 [6.97] -0.002 [-2.19] -0.004 [-2.67] 0.006 [3.52]
∆A/A -0.003 [-1.60] -0.006 [-2.96] -0.001 [-0.44] 0.014 [5.52] -0.003 [-1.91] -0.011 [-3.79] 0.012 [3.08]
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Table 6. Equity dependence and financing. Regressions of financing on market value and cash flow, by equity
dependence quintile and valuation level. We sort firms into five quintiles according to the Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) index of financial constraints, performing separate regressions for each group. Year and firm fixed effects are
included.
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We report estimates of b and c. Financing is alternately defined as equity issues over assets and as equity plus debt
issues over assets. Q is defined as the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over assets.
Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow over assets. Panel A shows results for equity issues for the full sample.
Panel B considers equity issues by firms with Q below 2.00. Panel C considers equity issues by firms with Q above
2.00. Panel D shows results for total external finance, equity plus debt, for the full sample. T-statistics are
heteroskedasticity robust.
Qt-1 CFt/At-1
KZ index N b [t-stat] c [t-stat] R2
Panel A: External Equity – All Firms
Quintile 1 10,397 0.024 [6.64] 0.056 [1.43] 0.41
2 10,396 0.035 [6.85] 0.076 [2.03] 0.43
3 10,397 0.040 [6.49] 0.154 [4.13] 0.43
4 10,396 0.040 [6.45] 0.144 [4.21] 0.39
5 10,396 0.044 [6.69] 0.087 [2.62] 0.40
Panel B: External Equity – Low Valuation Firms
Quintile 1 8,191 0.036 [6.06] 0.100 [2.85] 0.37
2 8,657 0.034 [4.57] 0.174 [5.06] 0.34
3 9,032 0.043 [6.29] 0.211 [5.89] 0.33
4 9,168 0.061 [7.43] 0.179 [5.39] 0.33
5 8,827 0.078 [6.73] 0.130 [4.10] 0.30
Panel C: External Equity – High Valuation Firms
Quintile 1 2,206 0.017 [2.56] -0.089 [-0.80] 0.58
2 1,739 0.037 [2.60] -0.144 [-1.08] 0.41
3 1,365 0.042 [2.13] -0.169 [-1.00] 0.41
4 1,228 0.022 [1.02] -0.053 [-0.29] 0.32
5 1,569 0.043 [2.62] 0.002 [0.01] 0.36
Panel D: External Equity Plus Debt – All Firms
Quintile 1 10,397 0.037 [5.90] 0.183 [2.21] 0.27
2 10,396 0.061 [7.01] 0.107 [1.48] 0.32
3 10,397 0.075 [7.84] 0.274 [3.87] 0.33
4 10,396 0.081 [7.59] 0.323 [5.19] 0.31
5 10,396 0.103 [9.38] 0.153 [2.56] 0.28
